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Risk Mapping of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Distribution and
Spread
A. Townsend Peterson and Richard A. J. Williams
ABSTRACT. The rapid emergence and spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza begs effective
and accurate mapping of current knowledge and future risk of infection. Methods for such mapping,
however, are rudimentary, and few good examples exist for use as templates for risk-mapping efforts. We
review the transmission cycle of avian influenza viruses, and identify points on which risk-mapping can
focus. We provide examples from the literature and from our work that illustrate mapping risk based on
(1) avian influenza case occurrences, (2) poultry distributions and movements, and (3) migratory bird
movements.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1997 emergence and rapid spread of the highly
pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1, hereafter
HP-H5N1, raised concerns regarding the potential
for a global influenza pandemic (Cox and Subbarao
2000, Webby and Webster 2001, Capua and
Alexander 2002). The impressive virulence of this
strain, both for humans (Katz et al. 2000, Parry
2006) and for some birds (Sturm-Ramirez et al.
2004, Chen et al. 2005, Olsen et al. 2006), combined
with its rapid spread across Asia (Chen et al. 2005),
Africa (Ducatez et al. 2006), and Europe (Alexander
2007), indeed is cause for concern. To optimize
response, forecasting and tracking the global spread
of HP-H5N1 becomes of key importance,
particularly in light of the diversity and contrasts of
opinions that have been expressed regarding its
transmission (ABC 2005, Chen et al. 2005, BirdLife
International 2006, Gilbert et al. 2006, Rappole and
Hubalek 2006).
In spite of the importance of forecasting and
anticipating the global spread of such an important
pathogen, few efforts have been made to map and
forecast HP-H5N1 risk across broad regions or
continents. Several publications have reviewed the
HP-H5N1 situation (Alexander 2000, Feare and
Yasue 2006, Olsen et al. 2006, Rappole and Hubalek
2006), but only in broad and general terms. Only a
few have made more quantitative predictions or risk
maps: poultry-based spread in the Netherlands
(Boender et al. 2007), connections with rice
cultivation in Thailand (Gilbert et al. 2007),
mapping and monitoring of bird migration in
various regions (Gilbert et al. 2006, Peterson et al.
2007, Winker et al. 2007), niche-based predictions
of HP-H5N1 transmission risk across West Africa
(Williams et al. 2008), and some more limited
analyses that will not be treated in detail herein (Guo
et al. 2006, Mulatti et al. 2007). Only one analysis
(Kilpatrick et al. 2006) has addressed HP-H5N1
spread globally.
In this overview, we briefly review HP-H5N1
transmission routes and offer an overview of risk-
mapping approaches that may be applicable to the
situation. We provide examples of several such
approaches, and explore how HP-H5N1 risk
mapping may be improved in the future. Perhaps
most importantly, given the paucity of detailed and
quantitative information available, we outline how
risk mapping and broad influenza monitoring can
and should be linked in coming years to provide a
more dynamic, responsive information base for
decisions and initiatives related to HP-H5N1 and
other emerging bird-borne diseases.
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HP-H5N1 Transmission
The basic elements of the HP-H5N1 transmission
cycle are fairly well understood (Fig. 1): in general,
the virus is transmitted from bird to bird without
intermediate vectors, but it can be held in bodies of
water for some period of time, and mammals,
including humans, are occasionally infected.
Mammal-to-mammal, including human-to-human,
transmission appears rare, as essentially all known
human cases have some more or less direct contact
with birds, usually poultry, and thus a clear
connection to the bird-driven transmission cycle.
Some indications of mammal-to-mammal transmission
do exist (Thanawongnuwech et al. 2005), but these
transmission chains are not self-sustaining.
Although the elements of the transmission cycle are
not in much doubt, their relative roles are the topic
of considerable debate. Some of those who opine
about the topic believe fervently that the entire
system is driven by movements of poultry and
poultry products, and that wild birds are incidental
hosts with little importance in overall HP-H5N1
transmission dynamics (BirdLife International
2006, Feare and Yasue 2006, Rappole and Hubalek
2006, Gauthier-Clerc et al. 2007) – we can term this
opinion that of “wild birds as victims.” A key point
revealed by inoculation studies is that at least some
wild birds can be infected without significant
external symptoms or death (Brown et al. 2006,
Boon et al. 2007), suggesting that they can serve as
carriers for avian influenza viruses once infected,
potentially even on migration. On the other side of
the debate, several researchers have recognized
significant roles for wild birds, e.g., “wild birds as
vectors,” in HP-H5N1 transmission and spread
(Chen et al. 2005, Gilbert et al. 2006, Kilpatrick et
al. 2006, Olsen et al. 2006, Winker et al. 2007),
although poultry clearly play a role in this process
as well. A recent commentary pointed out the
relative costs of choosing the wrong null hypothesis
in this debate, suggesting that the most appropriate
presumption would be that migratory birds are
involved (Flint 2007). The most balanced and the
only global analysis to date (Kilpatrick et al. 2006)
concluded that both domestic and wild birds have
played roles in the global spread of HP-H5N1.
Still more shrouded in shadows, however, is the
avian taxonomic distribution of host relationships
of HP-H5N1 transmission and spread. The standard
review of influenza ecology and host distribution
(Webster et al. 1992) states clearly that waterbirds
are the reservoir of avian influenza viruses, and
papers in the field almost invariably cite this paper
and assume this point to be well established.
Although influenza prevalences are clearly highest
in waterbirds (Webster et al. 1992, Olsen et al. 2006,
Munster et al. 2007), the occurrence of this virus in
landbirds should not be neglected in surveillance
efforts (Alexander 2000, Kou et al. 2005, Kwon et
al. 2005, OIE 2005). Recent inoculation
experiments have indicated that landbirds can be
infected and can become viremic to the point of
being infective to other individuals, albeit not
commonly (Boon et al. 2007). Particularly of
concern is the fact that major monitoring initiatives
are focusing only or chiefly on waterbirds (Gaidet
et al. 2007, Winker et al. 2007): appreciating a
significant role for landbirds becomes difficult or
impossible when they are not even being sampled.
Mapping HP-H5N1 risk of transmission and
spread
Three sectors of the HP-H5N1 transmission cycle
may be tractable to risk mapping (Fig. 1):
distributions and movements of human populations,
poultry, and wild birds. In each case, broadly
available data sets offer means of summarizing the
distribution and movements in those elements (Fig.
1): nighttime lights and census data track human
populations; specifically synthesized data or human
population surrogate information can key to poultry
distributions; and observational data, natural history
museum data, and other ornithological data sets can
inform regarding bird distributions and movements.
As such, ample information resources exist on
which to base risk-mapping efforts.
Three points in the transmission cycle of HP-H5N1
offer opportunities for risk mapping: (1) mapping
actual cases of HP-H5N1 and extrapolating to
identify areas that are similar environmentally; (2)
mapping movements and commerce in poultry and
poultry products; (3) mapping wild bird migration
patterns, potentially educated by information from
ongoing monitoring efforts. We review each of
these opportunities in the paragraphs that follow,
illustrating each with examples, and identifying
paths toward further improvement.
An alternative approach, not explored or discussed
in detail herein, is the risk analysis approach, in
which hazard identification, risk assessment,
management, and communication are outlined. This
Ecology and Society 13(2): 15
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art15/
Fig. 1. Diagrammatic summary of transmission routes of avian influenza viruses, showing major
transmission routes (thick arrows) and minor transmission routes (slender arrows).
suite of ideas has been applied to avian influenza
transmission in Ethiopia (Goutard et al. 2007) and
Vietnam (Pfeiffer et al. 2007), and might be useful
in refining and improving the more elemental,
process-based mapping attempts outlined herein.
That is to say, while we do not discount the utility
of this approach, we feel that it is not sufficiently
connected to HP-H5N1 transmission biology to
form the basis for full risk assessments.
Finally, we note that low-pathogenic influenzas can
be more numerous than the high-pathogenic viruses,
and can thus provide much more abundant
information regarding their ecology and distribution.
HP-H5N1 is still relatively rare, and is restricted to
the Old World, and detections are consequently
quite rare, limiting opportunities for detailed study.
As low-pathogenic strains can evolve into high-
pathogenic forms (Chen et al. 2004), their detailed
study is more than warranted, although differences
in transmission should be borne in mind. Research
attention should thus not focus only on HP-H5N1,
but should extend to avian influenza viruses in
general, so as to maximize the information gained
and its utility in understanding a complex situation.
Mapping HP-H5N1 cases
The simplest approach to risk mapping is that of
treating the entire transmission cycle effectively as
a black box, and simply focusing on the spatial
position and environmental characteristics of sites
where humans or poultry contract the disease
(Peterson 2006). This approach has the advantage
of accessing a maximum of information, i.e., any
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site where the disease has been detected. However,
it should be borne in mind that it integrates across
all of the diverse processes that make for such an
occurrence being detected, that is, biases at any
point from the pathogen itself through to diagnosis
and reporting can create a nonrandom distribution
that appears predictive (Peterson 2006, 2008). As
such, independent testing and repeated challenging
of models to be predictive and general are central
to this application of risk mapping.
Given the simple, bird-to-bird transmission cycle of
HP-H5N1, and given the broad spectrum of birds
apparently involved, i.e., both poultry and wild
birds, it might be expected that no clear ecological
signature would be detectable. Curiously, though,
the two detailed analyses that have been developed
along these lines (Gilbert et al. 2007, Williams et
al. 2008) have both found significant, predictive
environmental signals indicative of higher risk of
HP-H5N1 transmission. Clearly, this area of risk
mapping for HP-H5N1 demands more attention to
determine whether it is simply tracking inherent, but
subtle, biases in occurrence data, or whether the
environmental signals are genuinely associated with
HP-H5N1 transmission.
The first “black box” study focused on free-ranging
domestic duck populations in Thailand (Gilbert et
al. 2007). The tie between HP-H5N1 transmission
and free-ranging domestic duck populations was
already well established (Hulse-Post et al. 2005), so
the novelty of this study hinges on identification of
coarse-scale environmental signals of domestic
duck populations that are detectable repeatably and
quantitatively in remotely sensed imagery (Gilbert
et al. 2007). The study resulted in clear “signatures”
of domestic duck populations related to the length
of the growing season for second rice plantings and
harvest in Thailand, suggesting that HP-H5N1
transmission risk can be mapped successfully, at
least in Southeast Asia, where duck production is
so key.
The second such study (Williams et al. 2008) is
much less clear mechanistically as to why risk
mapping should be possible. Here, the authors
focused on HP-H5N1 occurrences in Nigeria, where
poultry flocks are not clearly and consistently
associated with such a prominent landscape feature
as rice cultivation. Using tools for ecological niche
modeling (Peterson 2006), they related sites of
known occurrence to a set of remotely sensed
images summarizing month-to-month variation in
“greenness” (normalized difference vegetation
index); models were challenged to predict broad
sectors of the country and of West Africa from
which occurrence data were withheld in the
modeling process. The models, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly given the lack of easily detectable
environmental signals, e.g., rice paddies, were able
to predict the great majority of independent
occurrences in numerous tests (see Fig. 2 for an
example); nonetheless, considerable additional
testing is necessary before such analyses can be
considered to be genuinely predictive of HP-H5N1
transmission potential.
This sort of black-box risk mapping works only if
consistent environmental signals are associated
with HP-H5N1 transmission, and, of course, it can
be applied in a region only when some number of
occurrences has already occurred. In the case of
individual species’ distributions, the niche-
modeling approach functions admirably thanks to
species’ ecological niches (Pulliam 2000, Soberón
and Peterson 2005, Soberón 2007). For HP-H5N1,
however, the case is less clear, as the black box
subsumes many and very diverse species and
processes, except in the clearest cases, such as the
rice-paddy duck production in Southeast Asia. The
environmental signal, in essence the “ecological
niche” of the transmission cycle, could come from
some environmentally-constrained step in the cycle,
or it could come from some consistent source of bias
in sampling or reporting. Clearly, this area of HP-
H5N1 risk mapping will require further testing and
experimentation before it can be considered as a
reliable source of information.
Mapping poultry movements
Moving away from simple, black-box approaches,
an important element in HP-H5N1 transmission is
movements of poultry and poultry products. As has
been noted frequently (Kilpatrick et al. 2006), this
element in the transmission cycle is difficult to
quantify and map in detail owing to the combination
of local, unregulated movements and trade in
poultry by peasant farmers, and the broader-scale,
illicit bird trade (Van Borm et al. 2005).
Consequently, detailed considerations of this factor
are complex, and only two previous HP-H5N1 risk-
mapping efforts have included dimensions of
poultry movements (Kilpatrick et al. 2006, Boender
et al. 2007).
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Fig. 2. Example prediction of HP-H5N1 occurrences in poultry in Nigeria (Williams et al. 2008). Dotted
circles indicate 72 occurrences in January-November 2006 that were used to train the model. Model
predictions are summarized as a ramp of colors, ranging from white (all replicate models agreed in
predicting absence) to red (all replicate models agreed in predicting potential for presence). Yellow
squares indicate independent occurrences from November 2006-January 2007 that were used to test the
model predictions. Note the close correspondence between the spatial position of these occurrences and
the red areas, which was statistically significantly better than random.
Boender et al. (2007) developed scenarios of spread
of highly pathogenic avian influenza based on the
spatial distribution of infected and uninfected
poultry farms in the Netherlands, estimating farm-
to-farm transmission probabilities based on inter-
farm distances. The resulting risk maps are sensitive
to parameter estimates, which become less precise
when based on less-complete data. However, the
principal limitation of this approach is that of
obtaining detailed locations of all relevant poultry
farms in a region, particularly when study regions
are broad and cross multiple states or countries.
The second poultry-based risk mapping effort is the
global HP-H5N1 risk evaluation of Kilpatrick et al.
(2006). Combining information on legal poultry
trade with information on bird migration (see
separate discussion below), this analysis produced
country-level maps of the chances of HP-H5N1
introduction (Fig. 3), and offered several novel
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Fig. 3. Predicted risk of HP-H5N1 introduction from countries that have had H5N1 outbreaks (in blue).
(a–c) Risk was estimated as number of infectious bird days caused by trade in: live poultry with no trade
restrictions (a), live poultry with no exports from countries reporting H5N1 in poultry (b), and captive
wild birds with no exports from countries reporting H5N1 in poultry (c) as in b. (d) Estimated number of
ducks, geese, and swans migrating between mainland continents, number of infectious bird days, and
number of species (in parentheses). Reproduced from Kilpatrick et al. (2006).
insights into introduction potential, e.g., risk of
introduction into North America via South America.
This study was limited in several dimensions,
particularly in its focus on legal poultry trade,
neglecting the much-less-regulated but not
negligible illicit trade, and in its spatial resolution
at the level of countries only. It is, however, worth
mentioning that this analysis, i.e., the only one to
date that includes dimensions of both domestic and
wild birds, concluded that both sets of bird
populations, i.e., poultry and wild birds, have
contributed to the spread of HP-H5N1.
Mapping bird migration
The dimension of HP-H5N1 transmission that is
perhaps most amenable to detailed mapping is that
of bird distributions and movements. Given several
centuries of study by ornithologists, as well as
intense popular interest, birds rank among the best
known of all major taxa (del Hoyo et al. 1992-2007),
with detailed distributional information available
for most species. Several studies have taken
advantage of such information to develop insights
into how wild bird movements could serve to
disperse HP-H5N1 broadly across regions (Gilbert
et al. 2006, Kilpatrick et al. 2006, Peterson et al.
2007, Winker et al. 2007), although a genuinely
detailed synthesis has yet to be developed.
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Fig. 4. Summary of wintering and breeding distributions of species that breed across both hemispheres
in the Holarctic, but winter at least in part in the Americas; one species (Larus ridibundus) ranges
considerably farther south in Russia, extending to areas that have indeed seen HP-H5N1 outbreaks.
Color ramp indicates numbers of species (white = 0, darkest shade = 5 species). From Peterson et al.
(2007).
The global evaluation cited above (Kilpatrick et al.
2006) relied generally on information regarding bird
movements along migratory pathways, which (as
will be seen below) can be deceptively simple, and
can miss important details. Similarly, the regional
analysis of Gilbert et al. (2006) was also based on
coarse-resolution flyway information on migratory
bird movements. Reliance on such summary
information can limit the spatial resolution of
resulting information products. As such, in the
following paragraphs, we review two recent, and
more detailed, studies that deal with migration
summaries on a species-by-species basis not
constrained by the coarse detail and resolution of
flyway information.
At coarse scales, an important suite of questions
revolves around bird-mediated dispersal between
continents. Although these questions have seen
considerable speculation in recent commentaries
(Rappole et al. 2000, Rappole and Hubalek 2006),
real data and quantitative approaches can be more
revealing. These questions were addressed recently
in an HP-H5N1 context by Peterson et al. (2007).
The question was how HP-H5N1, if it is being
spread across Europe, Asia, and Africa by migratory
birds, could potentially reach the Americas. The
conventional focus in the Americas has been on
western Alaska as the most likely “port of entry”
for the virus into the region (NBII 2006). Peterson
et al. (2007), however, digitized summer and winter
range maps for all of the 157 bird species that show
regular seasonal movements between the two
hemispheres, and illustrated that two very distinct
patterns are present: birds that winter in southern
Eurasia, breed across northern Eurasia, and have
marginal breeding populations in northwestern or
northeastern North America, i.e., the conventional
focus, but also birds that winter in the Americas, but
breed across northern North America and into
northern Eurasia marginally (Fig. 4). The
distributional patterns of these two sets of species
contrast sharply, with the latter group ranging
broadly southward into the Americas, suggesting
that the western Alaska focus of attention may not
be sufficient for effective HP-H5N1 monitoring.
This study also illustrates vividly the perils of
overreliance on summary data on migratory
pathways, when individual species may behave in
ways that do not ‘fit’ the general pattern
comfortably.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the complexities of bird migration, when information on connectivity of areas is
considered, even within a single species. Here, U.S. Bird Banding Laboratory data on banding and
recovery events in breeding and winter seasons of Greater White-fronted Geese (Anser albifrons) are
plotted on a map of North America. Records, i.e., lines connecting breeding and wintering records
corresponding to banding and recovery of a single individual, not intended to reflect migratory routes,
from particular areas of the breeding range are highlighted in different colors. Note that a significant
portion of the blue lines also stops along the Pacific coast of North America, coincident with the winter
destination of the red lines, and that none of the red lines extends farther east than the west coast.
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At finer scales, the challenges of data resources
become more acute. Ideally, patterns of connectivity
of areas via bird migration would be mapped at fine
scales, rather than just at the level of countries or
flyways, but the technology for establishing such
connectivity is only now being explored.
Possibilities include stable isotope mapping
(Farmer et al. 2004, Atkinson et al. 2005), fine-scale
phylogeographic studies (Kelly et al. 2005),
tracking of satellite transmitters attached to
individual birds (Webster et al. 2002), and direct
detections of connectivity from banding data
(Belthoff and Gauthreaux 1991). Nonetheless,
major challenges confront any broadscale efforts in
this dimension.
To illustrate both the complexity of such
applications and the need for probabilistic
approaches to migratory connectivity, we show
example patterns from Greater White-fronted Geese
(Anser albifrons) in North America (Fig. 5) based
on banding recoveries. Certainly, such analyses are
subject to myriad caveats and qualifications, but the
information provided for connectivity between
breeding and wintering distributional areas for those
species for which sample sizes are sufficient is
almost unique. The resulting patterns are more
complex than the simple flyway maps would
suggest. In particular, while extreme coastal Alaska
is connected via migration principally to the west
coast of North America, individuals from areas just
a few hundred kilometers inland, but still in western
Alaska, range much more broadly across western
North America. Only by combining information
across many such individual species will a genuine
and complete picture of migratory connectivity be
possible.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The challenge of mapping risk of HP-H5N1
dispersal and transmission is clearly complex. Each
element of the transmission cycle that can be
mapped has significant caveats associated with it
(see above): niche modeling of landscape suitability
demands adequate identification of causal elements
of landscape environments and how they actually
affect HP-H5N1 transmission; poultry mapping
requires more accurate summaries of official
poultry distributions, but also resolution of the much
more difficult challenges of mapping peasant-
owned poultry and illicit poultry movements; and
mapping of bird migration requires improved
protocols for integrating diverse data streams into a
single overall picture. However, the only path to a
genuine synthesis of the situation would include
combination of all of these elements into a single
analysis, i.e., broadscale connectivity via migratory
birds, local and broadscale connectivity via poultry
and poultry products, and local landscape suitability
from ecological niche models. Clearly, the
complexity of data, analyses, and interpretation in
such a system would be daunting.
Nonetheless, the examples cited in this overview
should, we hope, offer some stimulus. That is,
important components of HP-H5N1 dispersal and
transmission are amenable to analysis and mapping,
and good templates for such mapping efforts are
available already. As such, workers in particular
situations and particular regions can take techniques
already prototyped, and adapt them to particular
challenges and questions. In this way, important
portions of the HP-H5N1 risk mapping challenge
can indeed be taken on as feasible steps.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art15/responses/
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